Misquote notes: A number of sources attribute a paraphrased version of Kissinger’s quote to his original Foreign Affairs article:

Actual – “A country that demands moral perfection of itself as a test of its foreign policy will achieve neither perfection nor security.”

Misquote – “A country that demands moral perfection in its foreign policy will achieve neither perfection nor security.”

Source note: The Foreign Affairs essay was an adapted excerpt of Kissinger’s book Diplomacy (1994). The sentence cited here is identical in both print versions.

Extended excerpt [Foreign policy journal essay, adapted from Kissinger’s then-forthcoming 1994 book, Diplomacy]:

“A country that demands moral perfection of itself as a test of its foreign policy will achieve neither perfection nor security.” (p. 130)

Source note: The Foreign Affairs essay was an adapted excerpt of Kissinger’s book Diplomacy (1994). The sentence cited here is identical in both print versions. 

Source link [Featured source]: “Reflections on Containment” (May/June 1994) Foreign Affairs; online via JSTOR [subscription service]: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20046662

Source [Kissinger text – misquote note]: Diplomacy (1994|Dec. 2011 Simon & Schuster eBook ed.) online via Scribd [subscription service]: https://www.scribd.com/read/224263224/Diplomacy#t_search-menu_821583

Extended excerpt [Non-fiction. Final lines of chapter XVI – ‘Troubles with Allies’]:

“The risks are plain. Free societies cannot maintain even their domestic cohesion by simply managing the present and hoping for the best. All too frequently a problem evaded is a crisis invited. The future must be shaped or it will impose itself as catastrophe. That remains the key test of democratic statesmanship.” (p. 746)

Source link: Library – Years of Upheaval (1982) online via Open Library [free subscription service]: https://archive.org/details/yearsofupheaval00kiss/page/746?ref=ol

Re-quote notes: Kissinger expressed similar ideas regarding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other foreign countries throughout his career. One earlier example can be found in his 1965 book, The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance:

“Before a government makes a major effort to acquire the competence necessary for developing a serious point of view, it must be convinced that its views matter not only by the grace of a senior ally but also because of structural necessities.” (p. 226)

[Re-quote source: Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (1965) Westport, CT Greenwood Press, 1982 reprint, p. 226]

Extended excerpt [Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, as a Harvard University Professor of Government. Quote begins just under page subheading “Malaise of NATO Is Organic”]:

“The malaise of NATO is, therefore, organic. The present system encourages too many of our allies to shift the costs and the responsibilities of the common defense to us. Exhortation will not alter this. Countries do not assume burdens because it is fair; only because it is necessary. Europe will not assume a larger burden for its defense until it also shares a larger responsibility.” (p. 141)

Source note: Kissinger appeared before the committee to discuss American alliances in Europe, and – more specifically – the U.S. obligations to the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO). The Committee chairman, Senator J.W. Fulbright, introduced Kissinger by citing his academic credentials & noting that he had recently published a book on NATO (The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance, 1965). Kissinger’s prepared statement begins on page 126 of the cited source.

Source link [Featured source]: United States Policy Toward Europe (and Related Matters): Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations… (1966) online via HathiTrust: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d02094760r;view=1up;seq=151

Source link [Re-quote source]: Editor’s copy – The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (1965|1982 Greenwood Press) International Standard Book Number (ISBN) 0-313-23219-9

Extended excerpt [Interview remarks. In the previous question, Fallaci had asked Kissinger to explain his “incredible superstar status.” Kissinger said he had theories as to why he was so popular, but initially declined to share them – and asked Fallaci for her opinion.]:

Q: [Interviewer, Oriana Fallaci]: And to think I believed it undeserved, a put-on act rather than the truth.

A: [Henry Kissinger]: “Well, it’s partly overdone, of course. But it’s partly, let’s admit it, true. What counts is not how true it is or how much time I devote to women. What counts is to what extent women are part of my life, a central pre-occupation. Well, they aren’t that at all. To me women are no more than a pastime, a hobby. Nobody devotes too much time to a hobby.” (p. 22, column 2)

Source note: Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci was already well known for her decisive political interviews when she spoke to Kissinger in his Washington, D.C. office. The interview quote cited here is one of several that led Kissinger to later remark that the conversation with Fallaci was “without a doubt the single most disastrous conversation I have ever had with any member of the press.”

[Source note source: Henry Kissinger, “Chagrined Cowboy” (8 October 1979) Subheading in “Special Section” feature: “White House Years: Part 2. The Agony of Viet Nam,” TIME magazine, Vol. 114, No. 15, New York: Time, Inc., p. 44,column 2; online via The Vault, TIME archives [subscription service] time.com/vault]

Source link [Featured source]: “Kissinger” (16 December 1972 reprint) online via The New Republic & EBSCOhost: http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=5&sid=e8e94d80-404e-4d58-b98b-485b39b34e10%40sessionmgr102

Source link [Source note – Kissinger comments post-interview]: “Chagrined Cowboy” (8 October 1979) TIME; online via The Vault, TIME [subscription service]: http://time.com/vault/issue/1979-10-08/page/60/

Misquote notes: Kissinger’s quote is sometimes paraphrased without indication that his original text was modified:

Original text: “High office teaches decision-making, not substance. Cabinet members are soon overwhelmed by the insistent demands of running their departments. On the whole, a period in high office consumes intellectual capital; it does not create it. Most high officials leave office with the perceptions and insights with which they entered; they learn how to make decisions but not what decisions to make.

Paraphrase, noting edits to text: “High office teaches decision-making, not substance….[it] consumes intellectual capital; it does not create it. Most high officials leave office with the perceptions and insights with which they entered: they learn how to make decisions, but not what decisions to make.”

Misquote – paraphrase without noting edits to text:  “High office teaches decision-making, not substance. It consumes intellectual capital; it does not create it. Most high officials leave office with the perceptions and insights with which they entered: they learn how to make decisions, but not what decisions to make.”

Extended excerpt [From book reflecting on Kissinger’s first four years (1969-1973) as President Richard Nixon’s Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Kissinger is referring here to William P. Rogers. Rogers served as U.S. Attorney General in the Eisenhower administration, and was Kissinger’s predecessor as Secretary of State under Richard Nixon.]:

“Rogers had been a distinguished Attorney General. But the old adage that men grow into office has not proved true in my experience. High office teaches decision-making, not substance. Cabinet members are soon overwhelmed by the insistent demands of running their departments. On the whole, a period in high office consumes intellectual capital; it does not create it. Most high officials leave office with the perceptions and insights with which they entered; they learn how to make decisions but not what decisions to make. And the less they know at the outset, the more dependent they are on the only source of available knowledge: the permanent officials. Unsure of their own judgment, unaware of alternatives, they have little choice except to follow the advice of the experts.” (pp. 26-27)

Source: Library – White House Years (1979) International Standard Book Number (ISBN) 9780316496612

Extended excerpt [From book reflecting on Kissinger’s first four years (1969-1973) as President Richard Nixon’s Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.]:

“History knows no resting places and no plateaus. All societies of which history informs us went through periods of decline; most of them eventually collapsed. Yet there is a margin between necessity and accident, in which the statesman by perseverance and intuition must choose and thereby shape the destiny of his people. To ignore objective conditions is perilous; to hide behind historical inevitability is tantamount to moral abdication; it is to neglect the elements of strength and hope and inspiration which through the centuries have sustained mankind.” (p. 55)

Source: Library – White House Years (1979) International Standard Book Number (ISBN) 9780316496612

Extended excerpt [Interview remarks. In the previous question, Fallaci had asked Kissinger to explain his “incredible superstar status.” Kissinger said he had theories as to why he was so popular, but initially declined to share them – and asked Fallaci for her opinion.]:

Q: [Interviewer, Oriana Fallaci]: “I’m not sure, Dr. Kissinger. I’m looking for a theory in this interview. But I haven’t found one yet. I expect the root of all lies in success. What I mean is, like a chess player you’ve made two or three clever moves. China, first of all. People admire a chess player who makes away with his opponent’s king.”

A: [Henry Kissinger] “Yes, China was an important element in the mechanics of my success. And yet, that isn’t the main point. The main point…Well, why not? I’ll tell you. What do I care after all? The main point stems from the fact that I’ve always acted alone. Americans admire that enormously. Americans admire the cowboy leading the caravan alone astride his horse. Without even a pistol, maybe, because he doesn’t go in for shooting. He acts, that’s all: aiming at the right spot at the right time. A Wild West tale, if you like.” (p. 21, column 2)

Source note: Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci was already well known for her decisive political interviews when she spoke to Kissinger in his Washington, D.C. office. The interview quote cited here is one of several that led Kissinger to later remark that the conversation with Fallaci was “without a doubt the single most disastrous conversation I have ever had with any member of the press.”

[Source note source: Henry Kissinger, “Chagrined Cowboy” (8 October 1979) Subheading in “Special Section” feature: “White House Years: Part 2. The Agony of Viet Nam,” TIME magazine, Vol. 114, No. 15, New York: Time, Inc., p. 44,column 2; online via The Vault, TIME archives [subscription service] time.com/vault]

Source link [Featured source]: “Kissinger” (16 December 1972 reprint) online via The New Republic & EBSCOhost: http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=5&sid=e8e94d80-404e-4d58-b98b-485b39b34e10%40sessionmgr102

Source link [Source note – Kissinger comments post-interview]: “Chagrined Cowboy” (8 October 1979) TIME; online via The Vault, TIME [subscription service]: http://time.com/vault/issue/1979-10-08/page/60/

Extended excerpt [From book reflecting on Kissinger’s first four years (1969-1973) as President Richard Nixon’s Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.]:

“If history teaches anything it is that there can be no peace without equilibrium and no justice without restraint. But I believed equally that no nation could face or even define its choices without a moral compass that set a course through the ambiguities of reality and thus made sacrifices meaningful. The willingness to walk this fine line marks the difference between the academic’s – or any outsider’s – perception of morality and that of the statesman.” (p. 55)

Source: Library – White House Years (1979) International Standard Book Number (ISBN) 9780316496612

Extended excerpt [Newspaper coverage of Kissinger’s prepared speech remarks]:

“In a speech prepared for delivery at the 71st annual convention of the International Platform Association, Mr. Kissinger said: “Our foreign policy will mean little if other nations see our actions as sporadic initiatives of a small group reflecting no coherent national purpose or consensus.”

   “No foreign policy – no matter how ingenious – has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none,” he said.” (p. 9, column 3)

Source link: “Kissinger Urges Bipartisan Policy” (3 August 1973) The New York Times; online via ‘TimesMachine’ archive [subscription service]: https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1973/08/03/90461031.html?action=click&contentCollection=Archives&module=LedeAsset&region=ArchiveBody&pgtype=article&pageNumber=9

Extended excerpt [Essay, reflecting on the Egyptian-Isreali agreement brokered between Anwar Sadat & Menachem Begin. Sadat was named “Man of the Year” in the same issue of TIME magazine.]:

“The absence of alternatives clears the mind marvelously. Major progress is therefore likely. Geneva could be useful later in ratifying what has been negotiated and to provide a forum for other parties to join the negotiating process.” (p. 35, column 1)

Source link: “They Are Fated to Succeed” (2 January 1978) via TIME archive, ‘TheVault’ [subscription service]: http://time.com/vault/issue/1978-01-02/page/39/

Extended excerpt [Describing Dean Acheson, a lawyer who served as U.S. Secretary of State during the Nixon administration. From Kissinger’s book about his experiences as President Richard Nixon’s Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.]: “The capacity to admire others is not my most fully developed trait. That frailty did not apply to the figure of Acheson, so out of scale in his achievements and in his passion, in his moral convictions and in his prejudices.”

Source link: White House Years (1979|2011 Simon & Schuster e-book ed.) online via Scribd [subscription service]: https://www.scribd.com/read/224334932/White-House-Years#t_search-menu_339225

Extended excerpt [Conference remarks]:

“In all efforts for peace the overriding problem is to relate the sense of individual justice to the common good. The great tragedies of history occur not when right confronts wrong, but when two rights face each other.”

Source link: “21 Addresses at the Opening Meeting of the Geneva Peace Conference – 21 December 1973” (21 December 1973) via Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/21%20Addresses%20at%20the%20Opening%20Meeting%20of%20the%20Geneva.aspx 

Extended excerpt x

Source link: xx

Extended excerpt [From book reflecting on Kissinger’s first four years (1969-1973) as President Richard Nixon’s Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.]:

“Any statesman is in part the prisoner of necessity. He is confronted with an environment he did not create, and is shaped by a personal history he can no longer change. It is an illusion to believe that leaders gain in profundity while they gain experience. As I have said, the convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capacity they will consume as long as they continue in office. There is little time for leaders to reflect. They are locked in an endless battle in which the urgent constantly gains on the important. The public life of every political figure is a continual struggle to rescue an element of choice from the pressure of circumstance.” (p. 54)

Source: Library – White House Years (1979) International Standard Book Number (ISBN) 9780316496612

Extended excerpt [From book reflecting on Kissinger’s first four years (1969-1973) as President Richard Nixon’s Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.]:

“The superpowers often behave like two heavily armed blind men feeling their way around a room, each believing himself in mortal peril from the other, whom he assumes to have perfect vision. Each side should know that frequently uncertainty, compromise, and incoherence are the essence of policymaking. Yet each side tends to ascribe to the other a consistency, foresight, and coherence that its own experience belies. Of course, over time, even two armed blind men can do enormous damaged to each other, not to speak of the room.” (p. 522)

Source: Library – White House Years (1979) International Standard Book Number (ISBN) 9780316496612

Extended excerpt [Remarks during a United Nations dinner]:

“To those of you who are diplomats,” he said, “be mindful of what you say, for you are surrounded by members of the press.

   “And to those of you who are members of the press, be careful not to take too seriously everything you hear, for you are surrounded by diplomats.” (p. 25, column 1)

Source link: “Henry’s Advice” (6 October 1973); online via Newspapers.com [subscription service]: https://www.newspapers.com/image/81519046/?terms York Daily Record =%22Henry%2BKissinger%22%2B%2B%2B%22be%2Bmindful%2Bof%2Bwhat%2Byou%2Bsay%22

Extended excerpt [Essay. Kissinger is referring to Cuban leader Fidel Casto and Sukarno, the first President of Indonesia.]:

“If Castro or Sukarno had been principally interested in economics, their talents would have guaranteed them a brilliant career in the societies they overthrew. What made their sacrifices worthwhile to them was a vision of the future – or a quest for political power. To revolutionaries, the significant reality is the world which they are striving to bring about, not the world they are fighting to overcome.”

Source link: “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy” (Spring 1966) online via JSTOR [subscription service]: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20026982?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior%3Ad7edd27926b80058c9dfe19aab77d094&seq=20#metadata_info_tab_contents

Extended excerpt [Essay]:

“We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win. The North Vietnamese used their armed forces the way a bull-fighter uses his cape – to keep us lunging in areas of marginal political importance.”

Source link [Featured source]: “The Vietnam Negotiations (January 1969) online via Foreign Affairs: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1969-01-01/viet-nam-negotiations

Source link [Kissinger re-quote]: White House Years (1979|2011 Simon & Schuster e-book ed.) online via Scribd [subscription service]: https://www.scribd.com/read/224334932/White-House-Years#t_search-menu_339225